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the wetlands would have on the river, the court denied FD&P's motion
for summary judgment.
On the second count regarding the violation of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, the court stated that
Congress may regulate three categories of activity under its commerce
power: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons and things in interstate commerce;
and (3) activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce.
Although FD&P asserted filling its wetlands would not "substantially
affect" interstate commerce, the court found FD&P's plan to fill their
wetlands to build a commercial facility to further interstate freight
transportation to suffice as "substantially affecting" interstate
commerce. Therefore, the court held the Corps' jurisdiction over the
FD&P Property would not violate the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.
JessicaL. Grether
Bailey v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, Civ. No. 02-639, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23272 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2002) (holding that a
restoration order, after the denial of an after-the-fact permit for the
building of an access road which included dredging and filling
wetlands, does not give rise to pre-enforcementjudicial review until all
existing state procedures are exhausted).
Gary Bailey ("Bailey") sought judicial review in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota of decisions made by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), state agencies
("MPCA") and Lake of the Woods County ("County"), as well as
compensation for the alleged taking of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. The Corps, MPCA and the County brought
motions to dismiss and the court granted each.
Bailey owned a parcel of lakefront property in northern
Minnesota. The land included wetlands adjacent to navigable waters
and fell under the jurisdiction of the Corps pursuant to the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). Bailey submitted a plat to the County for a
residential development and before the plat was approved, he began
building an access road across the land by dredging and filling
wetlands. He then applied for an "after-the-fact" permit for the project
from the Corps and submitted a wetland "replacement" plan because
the project would drain and fill the wetlands. The Corps rejected the
permit because the lots did not have sufficient areas of upland and the
land was insufficient for locating individual sewage treatment systems
that would comply with state regulations. The Corps directed Bailey to
remove the road and the Department of Natural Resources directed
Bailey to restore the wetlands to the lot. Bailey did not comply with
the order and the Corps did not seek enforcement of the order.
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Pursuant to the CWA, it is unlawful for any person to discharge a
pollutant into navigable waters unless that person has a permit.
"Pollutant" included the rock, sand and dirt Bailey used to construct
the road. The CWA authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the
discharge of dredged or fill materials into wetlands. Minnesota also
enacted the Wetland Conservation Act ("WCA") prohibiting draining
and filling of wetlands unless the person replaced the impacted
wetlands by restoring or creating other wetland areas. The WCA
required MCPA to approve any restoration proposal.
After several applications for a permit, proposals for wetland
replacement and subsequent modifications to the road, the Corps
approved the permit and MPCA approved the restoration project.
After completion, the Corps conducted an on-site wetland delineation
for the plat and found the impact of the road project much more
substantial than originally approved. MPCA revoked the certification
for the project and issued a restoration order directing Bailey to
remove the access road, fill in the ditches, and return the land to its
natural state.
The Corps moved to dismiss two of Bailey's claims. First, the Corps
argued that sovereign immunity precluded the court from deciding
Bailey's challenge to the restoration order. The court held preenforcementjudicial review was not available to Bailey for a restoration
order because review of the order before the Corps brought an action
to enforce the order would negate the discretion Congress gave the
agency to decide whether or not to bring an enforcement action.
Second, the Corps argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to consider Bailey's claim that the Corps violated Executive Order
12,630 because no private right of action exists to enforce that order.
The court agreed with this argument and dismissed Bailey's takings
claim because the Executive Order did not intend to create any right
at law by a private party against the United States.
MPCA moved to dismiss Bailey's claims seeking judicial review of
the revocation of certification of the road project and the restoration
order. MPCA moved to dismiss these claims, arguing immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment. Bailey argued MPCA waived its immunity
through its conduct of reliance on the Corps' decisions. The court
held Bailey failed to meet the stringent requirements necessary to
establish waiver and dismissed the claim. Bailey, in the alternative, also
claimed MPCA's actions caused a taking without just compensation.
MPCA moved to dismiss this claim on the grounds that Bailey failed to
pursue all available state condemnation remedies and found them to
be inadequate. The court agreed with MPCA and held the claim was
not ripe until Bailey failed to exhaust existing state procedures.
The County moved to dismiss Bailey's claim that he relied to his
detriment on statements made to him about the county's possession
and ownership of the access road. Bailey asserted the County was to
take control of the access road and take responsibility of the permit
applications. Bailey asserted harm due to his reliance because the
County failed to follow through on its application for a permit from
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the corps. The court dismissed this claim because claim preclusion
barred common law claims against the County regarding the access
road. The County also moved to dismiss Bailey's taking without just
compensation claim. The court reached the same conclusion as the
MPCA takings claim and decided the claim was not ripe for
adjudication.
Julie S. Hanson

Johnson v. Calpine Corp., No. 02-2242, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEX S 22580
(E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2002) (holding federal courts have original
jurisdiction over the Clean Water Act).
Jewel Junior Johnson and Ina Mae Carter Johnson ("Johnsons")
brought an action against the Calpine Corporation ("Calpine") under
the Federal Water Pollution Act, as amended by the Clean Water Act
of 1977 ("CWA"), in Louisiana state court. Calpine removed the
matter to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana based on federal question jurisdiction and diversity
jurisdiction. The Johnsons moved to remand the case back to state
court. The district court held that federal jurisdiction was proper and
denied the Johnsons' motion to remand.
The Johnsons objected to the removal on several grounds. First,
they stated removal was improper because the mere grant of
jurisdiction to a federal court does not preclude a state court from
concurrent jurisdiction.
Also, the Johnsons contended that for
removal to be proper a federal court must have exclusive jurisdiction.
In addition, they argued that a section of the CWA mandates claims to
be held in state court. Further, the Johnsons asserted that there was
no factual basis for federal question jurisdiction over their pond to
establish subject matter jurisdiction. Lastly, they claimed that their
state claims predominated.
The district court determined that Calpine could remove a civil
action filed in state court if the federal court has original jurisdiction.
Further, the district court found that the CWA expressly provides for
federal jurisdiction. While the Johnsons contended that a section of
the CWA mandated that such claims be held in state court, the district
court held that this section only preserves rights and remedies under
other available laws, but does not restrict federal court jurisdiction.
The district court did not express any opinion as to the Johnsons'
subject matter jurisdiction claim, and did not find sufficient support
for the Johnsons' claim that their state claims predominated. Thus,
the district court held that its federal jurisdiction was proper and
denied theJohnsons' motion to remand.
NatalieLucas

